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Introduction 
Since the early 20th Century, Africa has witnessed varying degrees of subversion from the Mau Mau nationalist campaigners in Kenya in the 1950s to acts by rebel groups in the infamous intrastate wars of Sub-Saharan Africa. While the first movement evolved mainly from political acts geared towards 
the struggle for independence, the latter was mostly evident in attempts to obtain psychological or strategic 
advantages by combatants in the brutal civil wars of Liberia, Sierra Leone, the African Great Lakes region 
and a number of such civil war theatres in Africa. The element of unrestrained violence commonly identified 
as a defining feature of terrorism (Attuquayefio, 2006), was palpable in all these movements, yet the socio-
political or military drive for these movements barely included religion. The 1990s, however, marked the 
dawn of religious fundamentalism and its induced terrorism in Africa. With an overwhelming proportion 
of these terrorist movements tracing their foundations to Islam, a religion that is ordinarily portrayed as 
one of peace ironically continues to roll out some of the worst acts of terrorism in Africa. This arguably 
came to the limelight with the August 7, 1998 terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar 
es Salaam that killed over two hundred people. Subsequently in 2002, an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, 
Kenya was attacked. (Lyman & Morrison, 2004) The attribution of these events to the Egypt-based Islamic 
Jihad and other Al Qaeda surrogates such as its name sake in the Islamic Maghreb was the first public 
indication that international terrorist organisations were inducing affiliates on the continent. Subsequently, 
actions of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the rise of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, the insurrection of Islamic 
Fundamentalists in Mali in March 2012 as well as the renewed interest in security on the continent by the US 
and key European countries such as the United Kingdom and France all point to Africa’s emerging relevance 
as a frontier for the global War on Terrorism.
The US has conventionally been an advocate of global peace and security and has engineered actions, in 
collaboration with other countries, to guarantee this state of affairs. This notwithstanding, the post-Cold War 
readjustment of global alliances along the lines of geopolitical significance saw the gradual waning of US 
interest and activities in various parts of Africa. In cases like Somalia, humanitarian interventionist disasters 
further coalesced with this general trend to reduce US interest in Africa. Following the 9/11 attacks on the 
US and the consequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the US has renewed active interest in regions 
considered as brewing grounds for terrorists. The recent recalibration of US interest in Africa is, justifiably, as 
a result of the growing movement of terrorists on the continent.
Just like the terrorist threats, the approaches for US interventions on matters of national security have also 
evolved. From conspicuous full-scale military actions in the Bush and Clinton years to the “light footprints” 
favored by the Obama administration. The latter has involved the use of Special Forces, and other relatively 
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more discreet approaches. A critical element of the Obama administration’s counterterrorism approaches 
is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) popularly known as Drones. UAVs are remotely controlled 
aircrafts designed with a capacity to carry a wide variety of accessories for both civilian and military use. 
These include long range and wide angled cameras, communication and target detection sensors and 
military hardware such as missiles. Added to this is the stealth ability of some drones. Consequently, they 
are typical for reconnaissance, surveillance and target engagement missions (Washburn & Kress, 2009). 
Although, it’s been suggested that experimentation with drones have been ongoing since the early 1990s, 
its first deployment in a context of war was in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s where they were 
reportedly used as surveillance equipment (Turse & Engelhardt, 2012). Subsequent evolution of drones saw 
its emergence as armaments for target engagement particularly in post 9/11counterterrorism activities of 
the US. One of the early cases in this regard was reported in Yemen in 2002, where six alleged Al Qaeda 
operatives were killed by drone fire (Kretzmer, 2005). Since then, it is fast gaining notoriety as the armament 
of choice from the options available to the US.
The use of drones has however not been without controversy both in host countries where it has, for instance, 
garnered political fallouts generally deemed as unfavorable to US moral leverage in global affairs, and 
within the domestic politics of the US, where the administration has been accused of arbitrarily authorising 
execution of people including some US citizens. The latter has constituted a legal conundrum that continues 
to attract negative publicity to the use of drones. The tactical fallouts have been suggested as far direr, namely, 
an increase in volunteers ready to launch a global jihad against the US and its western allies following the 
fabrication of drone casualties in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. (Taj, 2011)
The readiness of the US to deploy drones towards prosecuting the war on terror in Africa has long gone 
beyond the assumptive phase. In 2001, the US acquired and renovated Camp Lemonnier from the armed 
forces of Djibouti and subsequently, in May 2003, designated the facility as the base for the Combined 
Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Since then, Camp Lemonnier has earned the reputation 
as a critical base for drone operations around the Horn of Africa and Yemen. In March 2013, President 
Obama announced further plans to set up another base in the West African country of Niger. Djibouti and 
Niger have been officially confirmed, yet, reports suggest that the US has access to a lot more operational 
ranges for drones than publicly acknowledged (Whitlock & Miller, 2011). In terms of operability however, 
the first reported use of drones within the continent was a 2007 incident in which drones guided antitank 
missile gunships to blow down a convoy carrying one of Al Qaeda’s top operatives and suspected hideout in 
Somalia (Axe, 2012). Since then, the US is reported to have operated drones from a number of sites in Africa 
including Djibouti, and Burkina Faso.
This paper utilises open source data to interrogate the state of terrorism in Africa (conceptualised as 
new wars) and the options applicable to the African context. It is argued that one of the ways the US can 
make game-changing interventions through surveillance and intelligence-gathering in several hotspots in 
Africa, without compromising its own national security is through the use of drones. The paper begins by 
briefly discussing the ‘new wars’ in Africa before making a case for the complementary utility of drones 
in fighting terrorism in Africa. It concludes by suggesting policy options to counter balance the utility-
blighting publicity currently surrounding the use of drones in Africa. A caveat underpinning this paper is an 
admission by the author that the causal and sustaining factors of terrorism in Africa are multi-faceted and in 
most cases derive from threats to aspects of human security palpable in terrorists-generating communities. 
Consequently, the phenomenon can only be addressed through a multidimensional approach – one in which 
drones can actively feature mainly through surveillance and intelligence-gathering.
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Terrorism: The New Wars in Africa
In the aftermath of the independence wars, the second major wave of conflicts on the continent–the civil 
wars of the post-Cold War era between the late 1980s and early 1990s saw countries like Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda and Cote D’Ivoire among others witnessing a succession of violent conflicts. The consequence 
of these conflicts were abductions, systematic rape, genocide and a host of actions that fall within the generic 
description of terrorism. These acts were mainly domestic in nature and perpetrated by ethnic and political 
groups. It was therefore not surprising that the US maintained a general disinterest in activities in Africa 
during that period.
The latter part of the 1990s witnessed a marginal rise in terrorist incidents on the continent of Africa. Unlike 
the previous period, an overwhelming majority of these acts were attributed to the activities of Islamic 
extremists. The manifestations of these acts were undoubtedly ruthless yet somewhat limited to relatively 
few countries in East and the Horn of Africa. In the 1998 attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam, for instance, two hundred people are on record to have been killed and over a thousand injured. Yet 
in comparison to the global numbers, it was insignificant. In fact during that period, Africa placed a mere 
fifth, behind Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East, as the most targeted regions for 
international acts of terrorism (Botha & Solomon, 2005).
In the 21st century, acts of terrorism in Africa have gone up exponentially (Hough, 2002). This is attributable 
to a number of events. One of these has had to do with the post-9/11 War on terror, and the military actions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US and its allies. Statistics have, for instance, shown dislocation and relocation 
of suicide terrorist cells and training camps as well as the death or detention of several top operatives of Al 
Qaeda following the commencement of the US led War on terror (Cronin, 2003). With the disruption of its 
activities, Al Qaeda has adopted a more diffused approach, one that has seen the centralised command and 
control previously held by Osama bin Laden diffuse to other parts of the world in line with the objective 
to strike soft targets of the US and its western allies. With Africa playing host to monumental commercial 
and state interests of the US and a number of Western countries, strikes against these targets have sought to 
demonstrate that al Qaeda and its affiliates still retain the will and the capacity to operate around the world 
(Crenshaw, 2011). Relatedly, the diffusion indirectly caused by the war on terror has made the identification 
and neutralising of terrorist cells more difficult.
The post-independence narrative of a host of African countries has also been dominated by human insecurity 
arising out of the multivariate effects of poverty and general economic insecurity, environmental degradation, 
inadequate management of health related threats to survival as well as erosion in the significance of jealously 
guarded indigenous culture primarily through modernisation. These effects have been attributed to political 
instability occasioned mainly by the politics of coup d’états as well as the tradition of woeful governance and 
corruption that defines leadership in many of these countries. Consequently, elements of human security 
have traditionally not been accorded superlative positions in the thought processes of African States relative 
to the desire by successive regimes to hold on to power; and where they have, in such lopsided proportions 
that parts of the polity are palpable left out of development. Responses to these local dynamics have evolved 
from largely tame protests to outright militancy and terrorism. The surge towards the terrorism end of the 
continuum have within the last two decades obtained motivation from the relative successes of militant 
groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in locking down national 
and sometimes global attention to their causes. It is therefore not surprising that Somalia, Mali and Nigeria, 
three of the countries in Africa severely challenged by the activities of organised terror groups have had 
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infamous records of human insecurity in specific parts of their territories. In Nigeria for instance, Uzodike 
and Maiangwa (2012) describe the governance challenges as “a cocktail of widespread failures of state 
policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatal, and endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment, and extensive 
underdevelopment in the North of Nigeria”. Within that context, it is not surprising that Boko Haram 
emerged and galvanised active membership among segments of the Northern population.
The franchising of Al Qaeda has also contributed to the increase in terrorist activities on the continent. 
Out of these loose arrangements, terrorists’ organisations in Africa, continue to adopt and adapt the modus 
operandi of Al Qaeda. One of the foremost organisations depicting this franchise is Boko Haram. Operating 
mainly from the Northern parts of Nigeria since 2002, Boko Haram claims to be fighting for the institution 
of Islamic rule in Nigeria. Beyond their objective, their modes of operation; a combination of suicide attacks 
and car bombs in civilian areas, is dangerously similar to Al Qaeda’s mode of operation.
Elsewhere on the continent, a number of terrorist organisations have engineered actions that fit within the 
anti-western agenda of Al Qaeda but also indicate, in some cases, the localised grievances of these groups. 
In North Africa for instance, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been engaged in some of the high 
profile terrorist actions against the West and its interests as well as supporters of western ideals (Masters, 
2013). Their versatility, coupled with the porous borders and vast territories in the region as well as their 
collaboration with other like-minded organisations in the area has resulted in an expanding trans-regional 
terrorist network, fast gaining reputation not just for its adopted Al Qaeda tag but also a conspicuous résumé 
of terrorist activities.
The West African Sub-Region is also home to two relatively recent terrorist organisations. Boko Haram 
operates mainly in Northern Nigeria and Cameroon, while Ansar Dine operates from Northern Mali. The 
former was formed in Maiduguri in 2002 as the Congregation and People of Tradition for Proselytism and 
Jihad (Onuoha, 2010). It is however known as Boko Haram, a Hausa moniker accorded to the group mainly 
on the basis of their proscription of western education. Similarly to AQIM, at foundation, the leaders of 
Boko Haram exploited Nigeria’s governance challenges particularly relating to corruption as well as socio-
economic vulnerabilities which are more evident in the northern region to mobilise a base of followers, 
discontented with the status quo. With known links to AQIM (United Nations Security Council, 2014), and 
operating in a region with porous borders, the fear of Boko Haram expanding their influence is justified. In 
May 2013, a military offensive was launched against the group in Nigeria’s three northern states. Aided by the 
declaration of curfews in some cities and air strikes on identified training camps, the military indicated that 
the insurgents had been “halted” (Abrak, 2013). In spite of this, experience with terror cells in other parts of 
the world suggest that once the underlying motif is active, the dislocation arising through the decimation is 
merely temporal as groups and cells relocate and often hit back in a variety of revised ways. Moreover, in the 
particular case of Nigeria, the military has gained a reputation for exaggerating successes while downplaying 
setbacks (Waddington, 2014). It is therefore not surprising that subsequent to the May 2013 offensive, Boko 
Haram has proven to be even more organised and effective, striking key targets and conducting high profile 
operations such as the abduction of 200 girls from a Nigerian government secondary school in April, 2014. 
A further threat to the region is the presence of Ansaru, a breakaway of fringe elements in Boko Haram. 
Ansaru has since January, 2012 sought to enforce the fight for Islamist rule. Though a smaller group, it has 
sought, and perhaps obtained, recognition through high profile kidnapping and execution of western targets 
(Onuoha, 2013).
Mali has provided another platform for brewing terrorism in Africa. With the fall of the Gaddafi regime 
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in Libya, mercenaries armed with weapons, proliferated during the war, moved into Northern Mali where 
ethnic Tuaregs have been engaged in a long-running rebellion with the government in Bamako over the 
independence of Azawad in the North. Mobilised under the name Ansar al-Dine, this group has since 2012, 
engaged in various acts of terrorism, thus earning the US State Departments’ categorisation as a terrorist 
organisation.
In the Horn of Africa, Al Shabaab continues to attract attention as arguably the continent’s most prominent 
terrorist organisation both in terms of its links with Al Qaeda and its ability to strike at western targets or 
targets considered as sympathetic to the western cause or detrimental to Islam. While it is deemed as an 
outgrowth of the Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), a radical organisation that confronted the Siad Bare regime 
in the early 1990s, in 2003 it began its operation as the enforcing arm of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU), 
when the latter took control over Mogadishu and tried to exert a level of law and order in the Somali capital 
that is most notable. Following the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006, ICU was all but disbanded 
except for the Al Shabaab that withdrew to the south Central region of the country and launched what has 
become a long running insurgency first, against the Ethiopians and subsequently, troops serving under 
the African Union Mission in Somalia. While its objective resonates as the creation of an Islamic State of 
Somalia, its affiliation with Al Qaeda has meant that the group has also sought to hit targets deemed as 
affronts to the global jihad currently been pursued by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
The trend of terrorism around the continent is instructive of the intensifying wave of Islamic fundamentalism 
and the possibility of generating and sustaining training camps and recruits akin to the challenges confronted 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also justifies the renewed focus of the US on Africa.
Negotiating Drones for Africa
The dynamics of terrorism in Africa are not lost to US policy makers. However, since the Somalia debacle in 
1993, the US appears to have conceded to its relative weaknesses on the continent (Adebajo, 2003). This is 
related to the fact that it was not a colonial power and its actions on the continent during the Cold War were 
mostly limited to covert operations championed by the CIA. The history of US actions in Africa has therefore 
been more of covert ‘drone-like’ operations than open warfare such as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The current hyper predilection for drones in the US strategy is in line with the Obama Administration’s “light 
footprints” and ‘leading from behind policy’.
Admittedly, the adoption of drones is confronted by some controversies. This can be compared to those 
surrounding waterboarding and other interrogation techniques applied in US detention facilities (Bellamy, 
2006). Unfortunately, the debate on the utility of drones in the context of terrorism is significantly challenged 
by what can best be described as the ‘Pak Syndrome’. This is the reality that debates on the utility of drones 
are heavily influenced by their application to the war on terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Consequently, 
the application of drones are confronted by utility-blighting propaganda that merely portray drones as killer 
devices and negates the intelligence gathering and surveillance relevance and the impact of such intelligence 
to the war on terror. This includes the fact that the intelligence gathered potentially leads to the prevention of 
even more strikes, and by implication, more deaths by terrorists.
The Pak syndrome also dilutes the complementary capacity of drones in the war on terror by highlighting 
legal conundrums particularly focusing on issues concerning the responsibility to fair trial for suspects 
and the application of principles of humanitarian law (Alston, 2010 & Sadat,2012) among others. These 
objections are often overrated and do not aptly reflect the reality that the war on terror is unconventional in 
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many respects. Moreover, certain aspects of the African context peculiarly requires the utility of drones. In 
arguing the veracity of the latter, it is submitted that an analysis of the trend of terrorism in Africa, points 
to some continent-wide commonalities from the use of guerilla tactics, the exploitation of large expanses 
of geographical areas and the implications of Africa’s infamous porous borders on the activities of terrorist 
organisations. While these illuminate the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa, it is also suggestive of the 
strategies that are likely to make an impact in relation to managing the phenomenon of terrorism on the 
continent. A number of these commonalities and their implications for drone use are examined herein.
A pronounced feature of the new wars relating to terrorism in Africa is the guerilla tactics (Onuoha, 2011) 
employed by the various terrorist organisations on the continent. The implication is that timeless principles 
of war, as espoused by the Geneva and Hague conventions, for instance, are not being adhered to. For Boko 
Haram, Ansar Dine, AQIM and Al Shabaab for instance, civilian targets are legitimate targets and so are 
injured US soldiers. The weapons of choice for terrorists have been decided more by availability and less by 
restrictions of Jus in Bello. A stark reminder of the abuse of legal principles is the attack on the US consulate 
in Benghazi, Libya, which, needless to say, was a violation of the inviolability of diplomatic premises; one 
of the preeminent provisions of post-Westphalia diplomatic relations. The tendency for non-state parties or 
their state sponsors to adhere to these rules of war undoubtedly points to the presence of an asymmetrical 
war. Unfortunately, the US is bound to largely adhere to the rules that terrorist organisations, herein 
considered as unconventional combatants, flout with impunity. In such an unfavorably unbalanced terrain, 
positive outcomes from the use of conventional security operatives even with regard to intelligence-gathering 
is dodgy.
Africa’s disreputably porous borders and the prospects they offer for trans-regional terrorism is another 
reason why unconventional interventions by the US should be contemplated. As noted above, almost all 
the Islamic fundamentalist groups straddle entire regions with relative ease. In the case of Mali, it has been 
indicated, for instance, that porous borders to the North have facilitated the migration of fighters from 
Algeria-based AQIM as well as vestiges of the Libyan conflict to move in and operate with reasonable ease. 
The fact of mercenaries crossing the porous borders of Africa means that mobilising terror for cross-country 
objectives of hitting US and Western interests is made much easier (Dehez, 2010). The expanse of territory 
straddled, the multiplicity of countries operated in and the implications on sovereignty that the US will have 
to be confronted with in pursuit of terrorist and networks makes it more difficult for conventional forces to 
gather terrorism-related intelligence. On the contrary, the reconnaissance capacity of drones makes them 
ultimately efficient strategies in monitoring the flow of terrorist networks and illicit weapons as well as 
building of training camps in Africa. Thus essentially, managing the long porous borders could therefore 
benefit from the surveillance capabilities of drones.
Related to the above is the lack of capacity of most African governments to gather and organise 
unimpeachable intelligence on the activities of terrorists and their networks. A number of factors account for 
this reality. The obvious being the lack of political commitment as manifested in the inability of governments 
to commit funds for developing intelligence databases countrywide and across regions. Additionally, 
terrorist organisations in Africa are operating on multiple fronts, adopting mutating strategies and enlisting 
combatants whose identities are at the least amorphous. This makes the collection of intelligence difficult 
and by implication, makes these wars generally less responsive to conventional deterrence strategies. In the 
absence of such intelligence, countries currently confronted heavily by the activities of terrorism such as 
Nigeria and Mali are having to depend on inadequate or inexistent intelligence to fight what is in reality, a 
lost battle ab initio (Amaraegbu, 2013). From the determination of terrorist cells to the identification of key 
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members and their arrest or execution, the reality is that the war on terror is fought more on intelligence and 
less on brute force. As such, the utility of the surveillance and intelligence-gathering capacity of drones to 
African governments grappling with terrorism cannot be over-emphasised.
The proliferation of weapons in Africa also makes it impossible to gauge the strategic or tactical ability of 
terrorist organisations. This could lead to significant miscalculations with unpredictable consequences. 
Particularly in Libya, where the revolutionary forces violently confronted the Gadhafi regime, the end of 
the war has hardly seen any meaningful programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
of former combatants. A number of combatants also alluded to pro-US sentiments for as long as Gadhafi 
was the enemy, a simple case of the enemy of my enemy being my friend. The implications of this could 
be obvious–the existence of many armed people fluid enough to be manipulated, proliferated arms and a 
growing fundamentalist rhetoric that can be mobilised for running terrorist objectives. A critical component 
of the US assistance to Africa as regards the war on terror must therefore relate to intelligence gathering and 
dissemination. The surveillance capabilities of drones are absolutely needed in these circumstances (Drew, 
2010).
Related to the intelligence deficit in most African countries is an infrastructural deficit that can forestall 
the progress of conventional troops yet can be effectively harnessed by radical groups employing guerilla-
style tactics. With vast land areas virtually undeveloped, such as the Sahel Sahara region, conventional 
military tactics will be confronted by accessibility challenges. Such terrain however favors the guerilla tactics 
of Africa’s terror networks who are prone to exploit such vulnerability of conventional troops through 
kidnapping and suicide bombings among others. Drones on the other hand, are comparatively less prone 
by design to the hazards of Africa’s infrastructural deficit. In this light, drones can better overcome Africa’s 
infrastructural challenges to provide surveillance and intelligence data on terrorism.
Finally, one of the components of the war on terror since 2001 has been America’s desire to win hearts 
and minds. Within the African continent, the US reputation appears to have floundered. Indeed, in terms 
of security, America’s record suggests an opportunistic actor interested in the continent during the Cold 
War days yet quick to demarcate its interests in the aftermath of the Cold War. While this is undoubtedly 
symptomatic of the wiles of global politics, the re-entry of the US to Africa’s security affairs based mainly on 
the assessed effects of African-bred terrorism and its impact on US national security should be approached 
with extreme caution, less funfair and more discretion. Under the circumstances, what is required is a less 
visible approach to intervention, one that favors the stealth operations of drones.
Considering the Anti-drone school
The argument has been made that using drones against terrorists is not the most lasting way to fight the 
enemy. To the holders of this opinion, the targeted-killing of terrorists does not deter their fomentation. If a 
top operative is killed, for instance, it is just a matter of time before he is replaced. Also, the point is made that 
the more terrorists are attacked with drones, the more they pursue a correction of the asymmetry by targeting 
innocent civilians as they are in no position to hit back at the drones or their operators (Whetham, 2013). 
Consequently, it is argued that, to effectively fight terrorism particularly in Africa, the human insecurity 
generators of terrorism must be eliminated or at least, reduced considerably through transparency and 
accountability as well as equitable distribution of the national cake to primarily reduce internal dissent likely 
to fuel insurgencies.
This position is sound and undoubtedly reflective of the multivariate causes of terrorism in Africa. As 
10JTR, Volume 5, Issue 3–September 2014
indicated above, for instance, the post-independence corruption and mal-governance-filled narratives 
of the Africa State is proven to be one of the creators of terrorism in Africa. It therefore stands to reason 
that the search for strategies takes into consideration aspects that rectify the challenges indicated above. 
Unfortunately, part of the local dynamics influencing terrorism on the continent may point to the 
ineffectiveness of such human security and governance-inspired strategy. Presently, for instance, the leitmotif 
for Africa-based terrorists has shifted or is shifting from out-and-out domestic concerns to a hard lined 
anti-west agenda. In such a situation, one can only be dodgy about whether the terrorists remain interested 
in pressurising their home governments into pursuing good governance. If governance in Nigeria improves, 
for instance, will Boko Haram disband? Will the group abort its objective of de-secularisation of the state? In 
responding in the negative, this paper suggests the presence on the continent, some terrorist organisations 
whose evolution and motive have no relation to Africa’s governance challenges, or who have moved beyond 
those challenges to represent a global jihad against the West and values largely considered as of western 
orientation. Thus, in reality, such terrorists are a bunch of ‘all or nothing’ intransigent killers not willing 
to meet anybody halfway and as such can hardly be satisfied through negotiations or good governance. 
This unfortunately reduces the human security and governance-inspired strategies to effective add-ons to 
multidimensional strategies much the same way as drones. As Olojo (2013) points out, the sources and causes 
of terrorism in Africa are multiple in nature and as such the best way to counter terrorism on the continent is 
to pursue a multi-dimensional approach.
Using drones as part of the cocktail of strategies for confronting terrorism in Africa must factor in the Pak 
syndrome. Civilian deaths and abuse of territorial sovereignty resulting from drone usage are legitimate 
concerns. Notwithstanding, they are bearable opportunity costs in the war on terrorism. Although the death 
of non-combatants cannot be justified in absolute terms, comparatively, incidents of terrorism are resulting 
in the death of more civilians than American drones have accidentally killed. Moreover, the point has been 
made that the civilian-casualties argument against drone usage has largely arisen due to the well-publicised 
quality of ‘precision’ drones are supposed to have. Thus, even one civilian casualty is seen as a preventable 
case. Such a standard cannot be achieved by any ground combat operation. Beyond the attack functions, 
the intelligence-gathering utility of drones is a practical tool to fight terrorism in Africa. For instance, after 
Boko Haram abducted about 200 girls from a high school in Chibok, China offered help by providing 
satellite imagery to help Nigeria track the location of the abductees. America supported with same, as well 
as surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance assets. The excellence of these capacities is undoubtedly 
essential to combatting terrorist attacks such as the Chibok kidnapping incident.
Conclusion
This paper is not in any way calling for a blank cheque to be issued to America to deploy its drones to Africa. 
That can only be inspired by the shallow assumption that all is perfect with America’s deployment of drones 
thus far. Through a policy of Disclosure, America can fight Africa-based terrorists with drones yet not leave 
hanging on the necks of African states, the albatrosses of preventable civilian deaths and a wanton abuse 
of their territorial integrity as has been the case in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. The surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering functionality of drones can be deployed by America to help fight terrorism in Africa. 
The mention of drones should in no way be only construed as a call for targeted killings by Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles. However, America should first of all, be willing to co-operate and share information with security 
outfits in the African states involved. If America’s deployment of drones to Africa is based on their explicit 
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consent to disclosure, it incites a careful and responsible usage on America’s part and reasonable trust and 
support from African states. Such transparency and co-operation between America and Africa will serve 
greatly the security interests of both parties; make Africa as less safe for terrorists as possible and also give 
America a colossal upper hand in its global war on terrorism.
Africa is now a hub of terrorism. Unfortunately, the continent is inexperienced and under-prepared to 
fight the war unlike America. Allowing Africa to fight terrorism in a handicapped manner is risky. Not 
strengthening Africa’s hand with an effective anti-terrorism tool like intelligence-gathering drones is akin 
to America shooting itself in the foot as that will leave a safe haven for terrorists and a cosy launchpad for 
attacking Africa and ultimately, America and its allies (Ahluwalia, 2013). Thus, it is in the interest of both 
parties; Africa and America to serve Africa-based terrorists doses of the same ‘drone’ pills that have efficiently 
ruffled enemy feathers elsewhere at virtually little or no risk to the lives of pro-peace soldiers. However to 
effectively do this, America must commit itself first to proper disclosure concerning their drone activities and 
also rigorously market the huge intelligence-gathering capacity of drones. The former promises a disciplined 
deployment on America’s part while the latter counters the dominant characterisation of drones as merely 
killing machines. In all these, the point best drummed is that drones are merely complementary with best 
results likely to be felt only if the domestic concerns fuelling the recourse to terrorism are addressed.
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